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The Affluency to Quit: How
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This study uses the German SAVE panel study in order to estimate the effect of intergenerational
transfers on the expected retirement entry age of individuals. The literature in this field typically estimates
the transfer effect on the actual retirement probability. We suggest to base the analysis on the expected
retirement age instead. This entails two methodological advantages: First, it is possible to exploit the
within individual variation for the entire sample (even of those who do not retire) and thereby permits to
analyze the life-cycle considerations of younger age groups. Second, the effect size can easily be expressed
in terms of time and thereby monetary opportunity costs. We find that heirs expect to retire earlier, even
when receipts are expected to some degree. Specifically, heirs plan to retire four to five months earlier and
thereby accept costs in the form of foregone income and pension entitlements corresponding to 20-30% of
the inheritance.
∗We are very grateful to Timm Bönke, Frank Fossen, Viktor Steiner, all participants of Wirtschaftspolitisches
Forschungsseminar at FU Berlin and of the BeNA Summer Workshop 2017 for their support and very helpful com-
ments. The data used in this study were made available to us by the Munich Center for the Economics of Aging
(MEA).
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I. Introduction
Economists have recently devoted much attention to the increasing relevance of intergenerational
transfers. Piketty (2011) and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for instance find evidence for increasing
bequest flows and warn about a return of a rentier society. Elinder et al. (2016) and Boserup et al.
(2016) analyze the immediate distributional impacts of bequest flows and Boserup et al. (2014) and
Adermon et al. (2016) relate transfer accrual to intergenerational wealth mobility. All these works
point to different dimensions of the consequences intergenerational transfer flows will probably
entail. But almost all of these papers fail to take the behavioral adjustments to wealth shocks into
account: How are households responding economically to a bequest receipt? A response to these
kind of questions is key to a deeper understanding of how the awaited inheritance flows will
change living in western societies.
In this paper, we want to quantify individuals’ economic responses to wealth transfers.1 The
economic responses can of course materialize in very different dimensions: Among others, Elinder
and Erixson (2012) for instance identify a reduction in the intensive margin of labor supply
after bequest receipt. Similarly, individuals might increase their level of consumption (Hrung,
2004) or, having bequest motives themselves, primarily add wealth gains to their savings. The
tracking of economic reactions is furthermore complicated by the timing of reactions that are
apparently subject to complex life-cycle considerations: Inheritances are certainly among those
wealth gains that can be expected. Individuals might thus have adjusted their labor supply, savings
and consumption to their loosened intertemporal budget constraint long before the wealth gain
becomes visible to the econometrician. Bo et al. (2015), furthermore, convincingly show that
economic reactions might still occur several years after the receipt.
In face of these methodological challenges, economists have recently focused on a lifetime
event that appears particularly well-suited to circumvent some of these problems: The retirement
decision of individuals. Retirement is a major change in the individuals economic life-cycle and
thereby subject to long standing, deliberate considerations. It is furthermore typically irreversible
and comparably simple to track in data. And despite decreasing replacement rates of public
pension schemes,2 most people still face a financially stable and predictable future when leaving
1Our paper thus undertakes a slight shift in the perspective: Typically, the literature uses wealth transfers as exogenous
variation in wealth in order to track the individuals’ economic responses to wealth shocks. Savings, consumption and labor
supply are likely to be planned simultaneously, using such exogenous variation is thus required to estimate behavioral
repercussions of changes in wealth on one of these dimensions.
2In the early 2000s the German public pension system experienced a significant period of reform. Formerly equipped
with relatively high replacement rates from the statutory pension increasingly required individuals to private provision in
a multi-pillar system. See Börsch-Supan et al. (2014) and Geyer and Steiner (2010) for a description and evaluation of the
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the labor force.3 Brown et al. (2010), Bo et al. (2015), Garbinti and Georges-Kot (2016), Blau and
Goodstein (2016) are recent studies4 looking at effects of intergenerational transfers on labor
supply exits. The literature typically estimates changes in the probability to retire after bequest
receipt. In line with economic intuition, recipients in most studies show a significantly higher
probability to retire. An ongoing debate in the literature however revolves around expectations:
Brown et al. (2010) presented the first study controlling for expectations about future transfers.
While they find that expectations matter for the strength of the economic reaction, they do not find
statistically significant differences between the point estimates for expected and for unexpected
transfer receipts. Surprisingly, individuals do not seem to adjust to expected transfers before receipt.
The authors hypothesize that risk averse individuals would only take the certainty equivalent of
the expected transfer into account and not its expected value. Garbinti and Georges-Kot (2016)
indeed find weak evidence for this presumption: Risk averse individuals seem to show stronger,
albeit again not significantly different reactions to transfers than risk neutral ones. The authors also
suggest credit constraints as possible alternative explanation for the non-adjustment to expected
transfers.5 With this paper, we want to tackle two remaining gaps in the literature: First, effect
sizes, mostly expressed in changes in the retirement probability following a transfer receipt of
non-uniform size, are difficult to compare across studies.6 Second, most studies dismiss the
life-cycle dimension of retirement entry and wealth shocks. The corresponding implications might
e.g. well explain the ambiguity of expectations in the last publications.
With the current paper, we suggest to look at the effect of intergenerational transfers on the
extensive margin of labor supply by using the self-reported individual expected retirement age
as dependent variable. Doing so comes with some advantages over the regular estimation of
retirement probabilities: The retirement decision apparently is a matter of long-term life-cycle
considerations. When modelling retirement probabilities, however, studies focus on a narrow time
span before the typical retirement entry age. The expected retirement age instead is available for all
age groups and thereby permits to analyze the effect of a wealth gain in a life-cycle perspective.7
major reforms. Also, we are confident that the reform efforts do not interfere with our analysis: Most reforms already took
effect before our sample period. Only the long-discussed gradual prolongation of the statutory pension age by two years
introduced in 2007 kicked in later. We control for potential effects of this reform.
3In an interesting paper, Dolls et al. (2016) test how informing individuals about their pension entitlements affects the
savings behavior.
4Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) and Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) were the first studies assessing the relationship between
inheritance receipt and labor market participation.
5We tested whether risk attitude or being credit constrained matters for the effect of inheritance receipt on retirement
plannings. Our results did not consistently back the mentioned hypotheses. Results are available upon request.
6The calculation of marginal effects also require the unconditional retirement probability in the sample and is thus
highly depending on the data composition. Many studies also ignore possible non-linearities in their specifications.
7We focus here on age effects. Since we only have a sample period of 5 years, we do not find relevant differences in the
behavior of individuals from different cohorts.
2
The Affluency to Quit: How Inheritances Affect Retirement Plannings
In fact, the expected retirement age should already contain the entire life-cycle considerations of
individuals after bequest receipt, albeit only the expected instead of the revealed ones.8 The expected
retirement age is surveyed in multiple periods and thus permits to exploit the within-individual
variation over time. A feature that also helps us to preclude potential biases due to unobserved
time-constant heterogeneity that can well introduce a spurious correlation between bequest size
and individual behavior. We thus claim to provide causal estimates of the effect of inheritances on
the retirement behavior. Expressing effects in terms of time furthermore allows us to monetize
the individuals economic response to transfer receipts: Specifically, we predict individual shifts
of the expected retirement entry age attributable to inheritance receipts and translate these time
ranges into monetary terms by calculating the opportunity cost of the earlier retirement. These
costs consist of the foregone labor income and the penalized statutory pension income during
retirement. Relating these economic costs of earlier retirement to the actually received inheritance
amount gives in our opinion a more informative picture of the scale of the economic response to
wealth gains. In contrast to previous papers in this field, we are able to answer the question: How
much of an intergenerational transfer do households typically spend on earlier retirement?
We are studying the effect of transfers on the extensive margin of labor supply in Germany
using a particularly well-suited, representative panel data set: The SAVE survey data was designed
for studying retirement decisions and covers specifically the financial environment of individuals,
their labor market history and their expectations about their financial future. Our sample period
ranges from 2005 to 2010. A minor downside of the data set is the relatively small sample size.9
Our results are as follows: Transfers lead on average to a moving forward of the expected
retirement entry by about four to five months. The labor market response to unexpected transfers
seems to be stronger than to expected transfers, albeit taking effect later. When using our main
estimation results in order to monetize the change in the expected retirement age, we find
heirs expecting to spend on average one third of their inheritance on a moving forward of their
retirement entry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II covers the description of the
SAVE data set, provides some descriptive statistics, and introduces in the methodology used in the
analysis. Our results are presented in Section III, we conduct some robustness checks in Section
IV and discuss our results in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
8Critics may respond that inheritances typically accrue in the age group close to retirement anyway. While this is true
for many individuals, there is a sizable share of individuals inheriting in their prime working age. Also, the temporal
proximity of bequest accruals and usual retirement entry bedevils the identification of the causal effect of transfers on the
retirement probability when resorting to cross-sectional variation.
9We also only observe comparably few retiring heirs in the sample. While we tested modelling the actual retirement
entry age depending on inheritances, we do not report the results here.
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II. Data and Methodology
II.1. The German SAVE Study
We use the German SAVE (Sparen und Altersvorsorge in Deutschland) panel survey from the
Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) to conduct our analysis. The SAVE has firstly
been surveyed in 2001 and was specifically designed for research on retirement planning and
old-age provision of households. We use the SAVE waves from 2005 to 2010 as they provide us
with 5 consecutive years of panel observations. The survey is conducted on the household level
and covers up to 3,000 households. Compared to other data sets, the SAVE is rather small.10 We
have however decided to use this data set as it permits us to put the labor supply decisions of
heirs into a broad life-cycle perspective.11
Labor market variables and expectations about future transfers are recorded at the (quasi-)
individual level in that the respondent answers most questions for him and his spouse. For most of
our analysis, we treat the adults of observed households as distinct observations on the individual
level. We are thereby able to increase the number of observations to roughly 26.000. As survey
data, particularly with respect to wealth, is always prone to item non-response issues, the SAVE
data provides numerous variables with 5 implicates.
We now briefly describe the key variables of the study and provide the corresponding descrip-
tive statistics:
Expected retirement Respondents of the SAVE survey are asked annually, at what age they
expect to retire or to receive pension income.12 Panel a and b of table 1 describe the expected
retirement age over age groups for the entire sample and for heirs respectively. The statistics
show that the expected retirement age neither varies substantially over age groups, nor are there
considerable differences between the full sample and heirs. It is rather conclusively close to the
10We thus do not analyze subgroups in this paper.
11The SAVE provides us for instance with data on old-age provision, the expected retirement age, expectations about
future inheritances and future replacement rates during retirement. The SAVE is also very detailed with respect to
household finances and socio-demographics. The SOEP data instead might have provided us with many more observations
of actually observed retirement entries. It however collects less information on retirement-relevant dimensions and has e.g.
only surveyed the expected retirement age in 1987. It has also only surveyed expectations about future transfers once, i.e. in
2001.
12In appendix VII.1 we provide the reader with some background information about the actual retirement behavior in
the sample. We naturally exclude all observations that are already retired in the first period of of our sample.
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statutory retirement age of 65 years.13
Table 1: Descriptives - Key variables over age groups
Age group < 30 30-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 > 80 total
a. Expected retirement age:
Mean 65.95 64.93 63.83 64.49 . . 64.82
St. Dev. 4.14 3.62 2.88 3.08 . . 3.64
b. Expected retirement age of heirs[1]:
Mean 64.63 64.86 63.97 64.37 . . 64.56
St. Dev. 3.08 3.18 2.43 1.65 . . 2.91
c. Share of recipients[2] and heirs[1]:
Recipients .0148 .0280 .0425 .0452 .0355 .0233 .0332
Heirs .0242 .07 .1014 .1185 .0969 .0654 .0828
Based on SAVE 2005-2010, own calculations. Estimates are
weighted.
1 Heirs are considered heirs if they have received an inheri-
tance in the current or any previous period.
2 Recipients are those individuals that have received a trans-
fer in the current period.
Intergenerational transfers The SAVE data surveys inheritances and records the size and the
wealth type of transfers on the household level.14 Overall the dataset contains 537 distinct
inheritances on the household level. We however do not know which household member is the
recipient. We assign a transfer that has been received by a household to both spouses in order to
measure the individual level effects of the actual respondent. This translates into 901 individuals
that live in a household that currently received a transfer, which is equivalent to a share of 3.3% of
the entire sample over the observation period of five years. Blau and Goodstein (2016) find that
primarily the actual heir or heiress is most likely to adjust its labor supply. The assignment of the
transfer to both spouses thus introduces a measurement error in the explanatory variable. This
will tend to bias our estimates downwards (attenuation bias).
In each wave respondents report the probability with which they expect to receive a transfer
in the upcoming two periods. We treat inheritances as expected if the stated probability for any
household member is above zero.15 The mean size of transfers ranges from 24,000 to 55,000 over
13One might directly compare the ages of observed retiring individuals with their previously stated expected retirement
ages. We abstain from this comparison, as its results are likely to suffer from a severe bias: Since our sample period only
covers 5 years, we can merely observe a retiring individual understating its expected retirement age by a maximum of 5
years. However, individuals might overestimate their expected retirement age by any margin.
14We base our analysis on actually observed inheritances and thus do not use the imputed transfers.
15Unfortunately, we cannot analyze the change in expectations about future transfers. Changes in the stated probability
over time might either result from arrival of new information about the expected event or simply from the fact that the
respondent is chronologically closer to the period of the expected event. Unfortunately, the data set lacks a variable that
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the time span. The average transfer as a share of total current net wealth has a mean of 38% and
median of 8% for individuals with positive wealth. The mean share of the transfer relative to





is around 50% for individuals with
positive net wealth.
Table 2 summarizes accrual and size of intergenerational transfers and corresponding expecta-
tions. Panel a reports for instance that for 2006 we observe 227 individuals living in households
that received a transfer. Panel c clarifies that of these 227 transfers only 57 were expected. In
return, 656 individuals stated in previous periods to expect a transfer with a positive probability
in the next two periods. The low fraction of received transfers out of the high number of expected
transfers is not inconsistent since the stated probabilities for receipt agglomerate between 10 and
30%.
Table 2: Descriptives - Intergenerational Transfers
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 total
a. Accrual of transfers:
Number of incidents 95 227 203 151 123 102 901
Share of recipients .0245 .0419 .0371 .0348 .0300 .0240 .0332
b. Size of transfers (cond. on receipt):
Mean 34791.23 54190.12 46602.75 24904.05 34724.8 42105.53 41675.65
Minimum 540.54 745.47 624.35 608.52 606.67 700 540.54
Maximum 281081.1 1171459 624349.7 202839.8 328614.8 385000 1171459
c. Expected transfers [1]:
Individuals expecting . 656 1224 1089 861 874 4704
Thereof receiving . 57 103 75 59 56 350
Mean size of exp. transfers . 49619.33 51739.3 29252.26 39427.17 57725.71 45160.11
Based on SAVE 2005-2010, own calculations. Estimates are weighted.
1 As we do not observe expectations for 2003 and 2004, we cannot provide the statistics for 2005.
As we will explain in detail below, calculating the opportunity costs of retirering earlier requires
to know the expected retirement duration and the expected retirement income.
Expected retirement duration In order to get a measure of the expected retirement duration we
have to (at least partly) rely on external data sources. We use a mortality table16 that differentiates
life expectancy with respect to age, gender and east and west German origin respectively. We
combine these data with a SAVE variable that covers how long individuals expect to live compared
to their age cohort. Mean and Median of this variable are virtually zero. Generally, by far most
people do not expect to deviate from their peers. The difference between the expected retirement
age and the calculated individual life expectancy then yields the expected retirement duration.
enquires whether the respondent expects to receive a transfer at all.
16The data is provided by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research and publicly accessible at http://www.
mortality.org/
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Expected retirement income The SAVE includes a variable that contains the percentage of
current income that the individual expects to receive from the statutory pension scheme during
retirement.17 We obtain the expected retirement income by multiplying this variable with current
individual net income. Therefore, we can abstain from an inflation adjustment. We neglect
private and company pension claims. Table 3 summarizes the variables underlying the expected
retirement income calculation over income quintiles. The average share of the expected statutory
pension income is relatively constant over the income distribution.
Table 3: Descriptives - Income and Expected Pension Income
Income quintile 1 2 3 4 5 total
a. Individual monthly net income [in Euro]:
Mean 260.18 771.03 1177.45 1673.2 3111.55 1396.92
Std. deviation 186.27 133.47 112.47 178.92 1976.73 1322.04
b. Total expected income during retirement [as % share of current income]:
Average share 66.89 66.82 68.35 69.05 69.48 68.26
Std. deviation 17.55 16.68 16.84 15.63 16.01 16.51
c. Expected statutory pension income [as % share of current income]:
Average share 53.67 53.74 55.34 56.15 55.88 55.03
Std. deviation 17.49 16.56 16.37 15.02 15.85 16.27
Based on SAVE 2005-2010, own calculations. Estimates are weighted. Income
deciles are based on individual income.
Control Variables Table 9 in the appendix presents a summary of statistics for the control
variables used for our main results in section III for the entire sample and the subsample of heirs.
Our main controls are age, individual net income (in logs), a dummy set controlling for self-reported
health status, controls for the employment type (civil servant, self-employed, regular employment),
unemployment history (never unemployed, long term unemployed), educational achievements, living
in east Germany and time effects. We furthermore control in all our specifications for the birth-
cohort specific statutory retirement entry age. Table 11 in the appendix shows how the statutory
retirement age varies.18
Because of endogeneity concerns, we exclude wealth as control variable in our main specifica-
tion, but will come back to the role of wealth in Section IV.1.19 We explore the concept of wealth
17In order to reduce the number of missing observations we simulate this variable with an OLS model. In total, we gain
12 observations for our analysis.
18The default statutory pension age was 65 for all cohorts before 2007 and depends on birth cohort since then. That is,
the statutory pension age varies over time and cohorts in our sample. See Buslei et al. (2017) for a recent analysis of the
implications of this reform.
19Wealth could indeed still be correlated with inheritances: First, by previous transfers, i.e. gifts, that reduce the
inheritance and increase the wealth of the children. Second, testators’ bequest motives could be driven by the wealth of
their heirs. After all, we address these concerns in a robustness check in IV.1.
7
The Affluency to Quit: How Inheritances Affect Retirement Plannings
in the SAVE data further in the appendix section VII.1.
Table 9 in the appendix shows that the median household income is around 2,100 Euro. Heirs
are on average a bit older, richer, and have higher income and seem to be better educated compared
to the entire sample.
II.2. Conceptual Approach and Estimation Methods
This paper primarily addresses the question, how inheritance receipt affects the early retirement
behavior. In an optimal setting we would observe individuals and households over their entire life-
cycle. This would allow us to draw conclusions about how individuals and households respond
later in life to inheritances received at any earlier stage. While such data is not available, relying
on cross-sectional variation to answer the research question entails two major disadvantages: As
noted in the descriptive statistics, most inheritances are received at an age between 60 and 69.
As this is also the typical age range for retirement entry, it is likely that cross-sectional analysis
suffers from spurious correlation. In order to deal with the limitations at hand, we will instead
ask how inheritances affect the expected retirement age. The expected retirement age is available for
all age groups and part of the survey in all periods which allows us to exploit the within variation.
Thereby, we prevent our estimates from being biased by unobservables that influence both the
retirement decision and transfers.20 Our main results depend on a linear fixed effects model with
the following baseline specification:
EARit = γ1 + θt + β1Dht + β2 Aht + β3 A2ht + Zitγk + αi + uit, (1)
with EARit as the expected age at retirement of individual in period t = 2005, 2006, ..., 2010, a
set of time dummies θt, individual effect αi, a dummy Dht indicating if the individual i is part of a
household h that received an inheritance in period t, Aht and A2ht being the linear and squared
Euro value of the inherited amount respectively (in 10T). In order to assure a consistent estimation
of the standard errors, we cluster on the household and individual level in all specifications. Zit is
a list of individual and household specific control variables consisting of a third order polynomial
of the individuals age, logarithmic household net income, the statutory retirement age, a dummy
set for self-reported health status (5-point-scale from very good to very bad), and indicators for
being self-employed, civil servant, unemployment history and living in East Germany. The error
20Specifically, we think of earlier inheritances, family background and thereby determined values and disutility from
work. More such variables are conceivable.
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term uit is assumed to be uncorrelated with any of the covariates given αi. The estimated βˆs are
the paramters of interest, that we will employ for our further calculations as described in the
Section II.3.
Equation 1 is our main specification. For analyzing whether expectations regarding future
inheritance receipts matter, we slightly extend it by interacting the inheritance variables with an
dummy variable indicating whether a transfer is expected. The specification then changes to:
EARit = γ1 + θt + β1Dht + β2 Aht + β3 A2ht + δdhj + e1dhjDht + e2dhj Aht + e3dhj A
2
ht +Zitγk + αi +uit,
(2)
where dhj is the dummy indicating that household h in period j ∈ (t− 1, t, 2005) expected
(dhj = eht−1) to receive a transfer. e-denoted variables cover the respective interaction effect.
In a further specification we include lagged inheritance dummies and interact them with the
expectations indicator:





βDhτ + δeiτ−1 + ηDhτeiτ−1
)
+ Zitγk + uit (3)
This will allow us to analyze if the adjustment of the expected retirement age after the receipt
of an unexpected inheritance takes time as for instance the results in Bo et al. (2015) suggest.
II.3. Monetary Cost of Early Retirement
II.3.1 Problems with Direct Interpretations of Changing Retirement Durations
In order to interpret the influence of inheritances on early retirement behavior, various approaches
are conceivable. Most other studies estimate how transfers affect the probability to retire through
different econometric models (e.g. Probit (Brown et al., 2010; Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994) or
survival models (Garbinti and Georges-Kot, 2016)). Similarly, other studies evaluate the labor force
participation rate depending on heir status (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993; Blau and Goodstein, 2016).
An estimated probability is however difficult to link to the opportunity costs an early retiring
household is facing, even thouth these costs are crucial for the retirement decision. It would
therefore be more informative to express the effect in the dependent variable in monetary terms in
9
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order to relate it to the value of the inheritance.21
In other words, retiring a year earlier can mean monetarily different things depending in
particular on the expected income path and the expected duration of retirement. Specifically, we
ask what individuals give up when they decide to retire early in relation to what they gain by the
inheritance. This approach will permit us to answer the question: What part of the inheritance is
virtually spent on early retirement?
II.3.2 A Graphical Illustration of the Monetary Cost of Early Retirement
Figure 1 is a stylized graphical illustration of our method to measure what households give up
when they retire early.22 Imagine an individual with an age somewhere below xearly earning an
income as shown by the curve connecting points 1 and 2.23 The individual forms expectations
about her income over her entire life-cycle. In the case of retirement at age xusual it expects to earn
21Expressing the inheritance amount in terms of the households income or wealth (as e.g. done in Brown et al. (2010)), is
certainly preferable over a simple specification, but does not solve the key issue.
22We thus interpret the financial quantities here as stocks, i.e. we add up flows as e.g. income to aggregates comparable
to the wealth stock of received inheritances. One could of course also translate inheritances in a fair annuity and thus in
annual payments comparable to the observed flows. Such an approach is e.g. taken by Bönke et al. (2017).
23Figure 1 is only a stylized illustration and does not reflect sample properties.
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an income stream that follows through points 1, 2, and 3. When reaching the usual retirement
age the income level drops to the height of point 4 which is equivalent to the statutory pension
entitlement. The income at retirement is expected to stay constant until the individual dies at xdeath.
If the individual now decides to retire early at age xearly instead, the expected income stream now
follows a path through points 1, 2 and 5, i.e. the individual will earn a lower retirement income
but for a longer duration.24 According to the German statutory pension scheme individuals loose
0.3% of their pension entitlement for every month of early retirement.25 The regular pension
entry age depends on the birth year (see table 11 in the appendix). The area under the income
stream equals the total income over the lifecycle. In the case of retirement at xusual the individual
expects to acquire A + B + C + D + E while in case of early retirement aggregated income only
sums up to the size of the area A + C + E. Therefore the individual expects to monetarily give
up L = B + D, which we will call the monetary cost of early retirement. An intuitive way to
measure how much of the inheritance is spent on early retirement would be to divide L by the
amount of the inheritance. Obviously, individuals also gain from retiring earlier in the form of
forgone disutility of work. In a world without uncertainty, discounting and bequest motives our
method could provide a way to measure the marginal utility from leisure during last periods of
employment: The marginal utility of a monetary amount that is not spent on retirement should
then be close to the marginal disutility of work that results from not spending the amount on
retiring even earlier.
In order to estimate to which degree the inheritance is used to retire early, we first of all have to
estimate xusual and xearly. These are provided by our main estimation in section 4. In a second step,
we calculate the areas C and D on the basis of the expected retirement duration and expected retirement
income and the penalty term for anticipated retirement entry. We estimate the size of D on the
basis of the expected retirement duration in the period before the wealth gain and therefore neglect
that inheritances might affect the expected life expectancy. We do this in order to get a clear insight
in how far the income at retirement varies only due to the effect of earlier retirement (and not due
to a prolonged life26). Similarly, we assume that an earlier retirement does not affect the expected
24The retirement income of course also includes private and company pension claims. We however abstract from these
income sources as it is difficult to assess how earlier pension entries affect the individual claims. The SAVE data set
in fact contains a variable reflecting the overall retirement income as percentage of current income, which permits us
to calculate the share of retirement income attributable to private and company pensions. Regressing this share on the
expected retirement age and control variables gives a rough idea of the relationship. We do not use this information for
two reasons: First, private pension contracts are very heterogeneous. Second, from the individuals’ perspective, private
pension contributions and withdrawals can be seen more or less as a zero sum game. The same argument applies to the
savings of the household, which we ignore in our life-cycle considerations.
25Bönke et al. (2017) and Giesicke (2016) recently analyzed the effect of such penalty terms on the retirement behavior.
26See Attanasio and Emmerson (2003) for a detailed analysis between wealth and life-expectancy.
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lifetime duration. Lastly, we simulate the expected foregone income27 between the two retirement
ages (the path between points 2 and 3 in figure 1). The simulation is based on a cross section
estimation for the net income of non-retired individuals (see table 13 in the appendix). We regress
the logarithmic individual income on a third order polynomial of age interacted with a dummy
set of educational achievement and various other control variables. Figure 2 shows the simulated
logarithmic individual net income for different educational achievement levels. We here follow
the approach by Duan (1983) in order to yield the corresponding income in levels. We then use
our estimates of xusual and xearly in order to simulate the income at the two estimated retirement
ages.28 We average the income at the two simulated expected retirement ages and multiply the
result by their estimated difference, i. e. the estimate for ∆xˆi = xˆusual − xˆearly. From this we have
to subtract C in order to obtain the area B. Adding D to B yields the required estimate for the
total costs of a moved forward retirement entry, L.
II.3.3 Discounting
In order to make the immediate monetary gain through a wealth transfer comparable to the future
monetary loss through an expected change in labor supply, we have to account for inflation and
discounting. In our baseline specification we will only account for inflation in order to make the
monetary figures comparable. Since the simulated future labor income loss is expressed in current
27Since we are interested in the expected foregone income, we assume that individuals basically rely on a similar
procedure: They do in fact also not know what they will earn before retirement. We thus only need to match their
expectations about their future income path instead of the actual path.
28Since the estimates retirement ages are usually not round numbers we actually estimate the retirement income four
times - each year has then two estimates: one for the round year before the simulated expected retirement age and one for
the round year after.
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Euros and the calculation for the expected income in retirement is based on a stated percentage
of current income that the individual expects to receive in retirement, we do not have to further
adjust these measures.
We additionally have to account for the fact that a gained current Euro is usually worth more
than a future Euro even when accounting for inflation, i.e. the real interest rate is positive. We
therefore present a second specification where we capitalize the wealth transfer by 3% per year
until the expected early retirement date. Instead of discounting future foregone income, we
translate the transfer amount in future values.
We argue here that a further adjustment (due to the discounting of future values) is unnecessary
since we simply compare two monetary amounts and are not interested in the utility of current
or future income changes.29 That said, using a fixed effects estimator, allows us to control for
unobserved individual differences in impatience. The estimated change in the retirement age is
thus not affected by individual differences in the discount factor, as long as the discount factor is
constant over time.
III. Results
At first, we present the results of regressing the expected retirement age in a fixed effects framework.
We furthermore implement some variations by addressing questions that have appeared in the
literature: How do expectations about future receipts shape the reaction to receipts? Do individuals
react immediately to the receipt or only with a time lag? We then use our modelling results in
order to predict the change in the expected retirement age (i.e. ∆xˆi = xˆusual − xˆearly in figure 1).
On the basis of this result, we are able to calculate the opportunity cost of early retirement which
we then can compare to the transfer size.
III.1. Effects on the Expected Retirement Age
While using the expected retirement age as dependent variable certainly lacks the advantages of
revealed preferences, it comes along with two features that seem particularly helpful for our
analysis: The literature has raised the puzzle that subjects do not fully adjust to expected wealth
shocks. Using the expected retirement age then introduces a staging post in the analysis as it
29For that reason we also do not have to account for utility gains in the form of reduced disutility of work.
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Table 4: Expected Retirement Age - FE Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Expected Retirement Age
Specificaiton
Baseline
Non-zero Inheritance Received=1 -0.348* -0.111
(0.1663) (0.1817)
Total Inheritance in 10T Euro -0.084**
(0.0266)
Total Inheritance in 10T Euro × Total Inheritance in 10T Euro 0.001**
(0.0002)
Expectations
Non-zero Inheritance Received=0 × Expected Inher. Indicator=1 0.066 0.111
(0.1047) (0.1717)
Non-zero Inheritance Received=1 × Expected Inher. Indicator=0 -0.254 -0.404
(0.3362) (0.3718)
Non-zero Inheritance Received=1 × Expected Inher. Indicator=1 0.458+ 0.412
(0.2735) (0.5100)
Expected Inher. Indicator=0 × Total Inheritance in 10T Euro 0.142
(0.2241)
Expected Inher. Indicator=1 × Total Inheritance in 10T Euro -0.143**
(0.0552)
Expected Inher. Indicator=0 × Total Inheritance in 10T Euro × Total Inheritance in 10T Euro -0.010
(0.0195)




Non-zero Inheritance Received=0 × Expected Inher. Indicator=1 -0.062
(0.1708)
Non-zero Inheritance Received=1 × Expected Inher. Indicator=0 -0.847
(0.5653)
Non-zero Inheritance Received=1 × Expected Inher. Indicator=1 0.337
(0.3625)
Two Lags
Non-zero Inheritance Received=0 × Expected Inher. Indicator=1 0.015
(0.1701)
Non-zero Inheritance Received=1 × Expected Inher. Indicator=0 -1.194**
(0.3803)
Non-zero Inheritance Received=1 × Expected Inher. Indicator=1 0.196
(0.3966)
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Additional Controls YES YES YES YES
Number of Observations 16766 16766 10568 4679
Number of Groups 4798 4798 3334 2117
1 The table shows results of Linear Fixed Effect estimations where the dependent variable is the expected retirement age. All estimations
are based on a sample of individuals that are not retired in the first observation period. The estimations include a third order polynomial
of age, Log(Net Household Income), an indicator for having children, the number of children in the household, for indicators for self-
evaluated health status, indicators for being self-employed, civil servant and region (East/West) as control variables.
2 Standard errors account for clustering on the household and individual level.
3 Estimations are based on a multiple imputed dataset (5 imputations).
4 Estimations are based on SAVE 2005-2010.
5 Coefficients marked with +,*,** are statistically significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level.
reveals whether individuals at least had the intention to adjust or whether already the intention is
lacking. Secondly, as the expected retirement age has been surveyed in all years, we do not rely
anymore on the cross-sectional variation, but can rather attribute changes in the response to the
within-individual variation.
We begin this section by an FE estimation of the expected retirement age on the inheritance
dummy and the set of controls as described in Section II.2. The estimate in column (1) of table 4,
representing the average planned retirement response of all heirs (in the first period after receipt),
shows that the expected retirement age decreases by pretty much 1/3 of a year. Hence, receiving a
transfer reduces the expected retirement age by four months on average.
Column (2) from table 4 is our main specification and adds a linear and a squared term to
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the previous model and thus corresponds to Equation 1. Note that the three estimates have to
be interpreted jointly.30 We see that also this specification hints at a strong, nonlinear effect of
inheritances on the moving forward of the expected retirement entry age: The dummy estimate
is negative, albeit insignificant. The transfer amount estimates suggest that increasing transfers
reduce the expected retirement age (up to very high transfers), however with a decreasing pace
reaching the highest reduction at transfers with slightly above 420.000 Euros. Figure 3 plots the
linear prediction depending on different values of the inheritance. The three transfer-related
estimates are jointly significant at the 1 percent level. The effect of the mean inheritance (≈ 40T
Euro) on the expected retirement age equals -.33 years (≈ 4 month) and is significant at the 1
percent level. The average marginal effect yields -0.08. That is, increasing the transfer by 10T
decreases the expected retirement age on average by 1 month.31















0 10 20 30 40 50
Total Inheritance in 10T Euro
From a theoretical point of view, individuals with expectations should adjust prior to the
receipt while individuals without expectations should show stronger economic responses. We
now interact both the dummy and the transfer amount variables with an indicator equalling one
if the individual stated to expect a transfer with a positive probability. The results are presented
in column (3) of table 4: Generally, the results from our main specification seem to be driven
by expected transfers. Expected transfers reduce the expected retirement age with a decreasing
30This specification requires a careful interpretation: The dummy itself can be interpreted as a counterfactual denoting
the effect of an inheritance on the expected retirement age of a heir when the inheritance is zero. While this might occur
counterintuitive, the dummy is necessary as the inheritance variable contains many zero values, the dummy thus makes the
identification of the effect more flexbile. The linear and squared terms of the inheritance amount, isolated interpretation,
describe the effect of an inheritance of the size of 10T Euro on the expected retirement age conditional on being a heir in
this period.
31This effect holds conditional on receipt, that is, when only increasing the transfer size. In contrast, when increasing the
transfer from zero to 10T, one has to consider also the transfer dummy: The average marginal effect then amounts to -.19
which corresponds to a reduction of slightly more than two months.
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margin. The effect of expected transfers is jointly significant at the 5% level. Increasing an expected
transfer by 10T reduces the expected retirement age by 1/7 of a year. This confirms previous
findings from the literature that recipients do not fully adjust to expected transfers before the
receipt. Additionally, unexpected transfers do not significantly reduce the expected retirement
time, at least immediately after receipt. Similar to the findings in Brown et al. (2010), the estimates
for the expected transfers do not significantly differ from those of the unexpected transfers.
Bo et al. (2015) find that reactions to transfer receipt sometimes only take a lagged effect.32
We want to check whether unexpected transfers will perhaps result in a lagged adjustment of
the expected retirement age. We thus estimate a model in which we regress expected retirement
age on the dummy for bequest receipt from period t, period t− 1 and period t− 2. We interact
all of these three dummies with the correspondingly lagged dummies that are equal to 1 if the
individual has stated in the previous period to expect a transfer receipt. In this specification
(reported in column 4), none of the estimates for the current period is significant.33 The lagged
estimates however suggest significant reductions in the expected retirement age for unexpected
transfer receipts. The effects for both lagged estimates for unexpected transfers are strong and
highly significant. Hence, apparently individuals need some time to decide how to treat their
unexpected positive wealth shock. The results by Bo et al. (2015) might therefore well be driven by
the hidden expectation status of the observed transfers. In contrast to Doorley and Pestel (2016),
we however do not find significant effects in labor supply before the actual transfer receipt. The
results show that unexpected transfers rather entail a lagged response. Hence, expectations about
transfers determine the reaction time after receipt.
We might however underestimate the effect of expectations: The data does not allow to estimate
whether individuals already adjust their expected retirement age when they learn about the future
inheritance. Even a change in the perceived probability from zero to positive over two periods
does not necessarily preclude that individuals have already adjusted to their expectations. The
core problem here is that the survey question asks with what probability a person expects to
receive a transfer in the next two periods (and not if a transfer is expected at all).
32Note, that Bo et al. (2015) look at the difference between heirs and non-heirs using early retirement schemes, i.e. actual
retirement.
33The reasons for the insignificance of current receipts in this specification does not necessarily mean that our previous
model is misspecified. Note that the previous model specified the transfer amount in linear and squared term next to the
dummy. Also, the lags in the model of column (4) reduce the number of observations.
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III.2. Simulating the Share of the Transfer spent on Retirement
We here estimate to what degree inheritances are used to retire early. In order to calculate the
expected monetary effect of early retirement, the monetary equivalents of the areas B + D = L in
figure 1 have to be estimated. Since we are focussing on how inheritances finance early retirement,
we exclude observations for which our model predicts an extension of the working life after
inheritance receipt.34 Table 5 summarizes our results (we report some additional quantities of
the simulation in table 15 in the appendix) and is divided in three parts referring to different
subsamples: The first panel shows the results for all possible observations. Panel two restricts
the results to only those observations for which we can calculate the opportunity costs of early
retirement for heirs. The third panel presents the results for the same subsample of observations
under the restriction that the costs of early retirement may not exceed the nominal transfer amount.
First of all, we use our main results from column (2) of table 4 for predicting the individual
change in the expected retirement age caused by the transfer receipt, i.e. ∆xi (the difference
between xusual and xearly). For each heir in the dataset we simulate the (hypothetical) expected
retirement age if the household had not inherited and deduct from this the estimated retirement
age that the model predicts with the actual inherited amounts. ∆xi has a mean of roughly 0.39
years and a median of 0.22 years, as described in column (1) of table 5.
Based on the estimate of ∆xi, we calculate the reduction in pension income as described in
Section II.3. This is the first component of the costs of early retirement. The second is represented
by the foregone labor income: The simulated monthly mean net income at xusual amounts to
roughly 1830 Euro.35 Columns 3-5 present different measures for the monetary costs of early
retirement in levels: The median of the plain Euro amount of estimated opportunity costs revolves
around slightly more than 3500 Euro, the mean varies between 6600 and 6900 Euro. The mean
of area C equals 4770 Euro, the mean of area D 3028 Euro. Our simulation thereby suggests that
the decrease in the aggregated statutory pension income, D, is usually offset by the expected
prolonged pension receipt for heirs, C. This somewhat surprising finding has also been established
by a more detailed study on the penalty term in the German pension system by Bönke et al. (2017)
based on administrative pension data.
Relating the costs of early retirement (L) to the size of the inheritance on the individual level
34We thereby exclude 6 observations.
35Note, that this is the simulated average income at the initial retirement age. Hence, this figure refers to different years
and also different ages. The number indicates what individuals can expect to earn, on average, in the period of their
initially stated retirement entry age. This figure on average hardly deviates from the income at xearly since ∆xi is typically
low.
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yields our estimates in column (4). For 10% of the sample, we observe that the estimated costs
of early retirement exceed the nominal inheritance amounts. Since we focus on the share of the
inheritance that is spent on early retirement (which by definition cannot exceed unity), we consider
the estimates in the first two panels upwards biased and limit the costs of the early retirement to
the inheritance amount. Limiting does of course not affect the median which is constantly 36%
of the inheritance. Limiting the costs of early retirement yields however a lower mean estimate
of 50%. That is, we estimate that heirs on average expect to use up half of their receipt for
retiring earlier than initially planned. This estimate might appear high, it is however noteworthy
that we look here at opportunity costs: It is likely that the expenditure that individuals have to
finance in order to retire earlier is below the total foregone income during the early retirement
period and therefore the share of the bookkeeping costs to the inherited amount is likely to be
much lower. Individuals might thus not perceive to spend half of the inheritance on their earlier
retirement. Also, the uncertainty that is attached to the estimated future income might lead people
to devalue the future income stream. Similarly, the value of the future income stream is subject to
the individuals discount rate.
Table 5: Simulation Results (main model)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Expected Estimated Cost of Early Share of Share of
Retirement Age Income Retirement Inheritance Capitalized Amount
(∆xi = xusual − xearly) (at xusual) (Area L = B + D) (L/Inherited Amount) (L/Capitalized Inherited Amount)
Baseline
Mean .39 1788 6905 .76 .43
Median .22 1755 3916 .36 .22
Obs. 807 807 262 262 262
Subsample
Mean .38 1830 6905 .76 .43
Median .22 1716 3916 .36 .22
Obs. 262 262 262 262 262
Subsample with Limited Loss
Mean .38 1830 6602 .50 .30
Median .22 1716 3550 .36 .22
Obs. 262 262 262 262 262
Based on SAVE 2005-2010, own calculations. Estimates are weighted.
Labelling follows figure 1
The last column of table 5 shows an attempt to treat the potential discounting problem. Under
the assumption that individuals did not fully discount when adjusting their expected retirement
age, we capitalize the transfer amount with 3% per annum until the expected retirement age. This
calculation leads to an estimated income loss that has an average size of 43% of the capitalized
inherited amount. Limiting again the costs of early retirement to the inheritance amount yields an
estimate of 0.3. The median equals almost one fourth of the inheritance. Hence, our preferred
estimates for the opportunity costs of a moved forward retirement are displayed in the last two
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columns of the third panel of table 5: We estimate that heirs on average spend one fourth to one
third of their inheritance on an earlier retirement.
Table 6 reports the simulation results based on the interaction model (eq. 2). Recall that this
model extends the main model by interactions between inheritance variables and indicators on
having expected to receive a transfer (see table 4, column (3)). The reported results should be
interpreted with caution, though, as both the estimation of the model and the simulation base
on a particularly low number of observations. We report the simulation results here nonetheless
for completeness. Note that table 6 only contains the subsample with limited loss case but reports
the simulation results separately for heirs that expected to receive a transfer (panel c), heirs that
did not expect to receive a transfer (panel b) and all heirs that stated their expectations (panel a).
These results are thus conceptually comparable to panel c of table 5.
Table 6: Simulation Results (expectations model), subsample with limited loss only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Expected Estimated Cost of Early Share of Share of
Retirement Age Income Retirement Inheritance Capitalized Amount
(∆xi = xusual − xearly) (at xusual) (Area L = B + D) (L/Inherited Amount) (L/Capitalized Inherited Amount)
All possible observations
Mean .39 1803 6803 .44 .27
Median .17 1753 3354 .22 .15
Obs. 110 110 110 110 110
Heirs not expecting a transfer
Mean .15 1763 2476 .67 .42
Median .16 1753 2101 .75 .45
Obs. 64 64 64 64 64
Heirs expecting a transfer
Mean .72 1860 12877 .11 .07
Median .75 1856 11960 .10 .06
Obs. 46 46 46 46 46
Based on SAVE 2005-2010, own calculations. Estimates are weighted.
Labelling follows figure 1
The pattern in panel a strongly resembles the corresponding results in panel c of the main
simulation with a mean of close to 1/3. The results however seem to vary massively based on
the expectations status: While heirs that expected to receive a transfer react strongly in absolute
terms (col. (1), panel (c)) and thus also face high absolute costs (col. (3)), their relative costs,
measured in the inheritance, are much lower than those for the non-expecting heirs. The main
reason for this divergence is the size of inheritances in the two groups: The average expected
inheritance amounts to 111T Euros in contrast to an average unexpected transfer of only 5500
Euros.36 Also, the point estimate for the average expected retirement age is slightly smaller for the
group of expecting heirs before receipt, what suggests that they might have already counted in
a part of their expected inheritance. While concedingly based on weak evidence, the simulation
36Again, note that the low number of observations leads to somewhat misleadingly low average inheritances. These
values however provide the intuition behind table 6
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might however help to solve the riddle about heirs not adjusting to their expectations: The strong
absolute reaction suggests that heirs did not adjust to their expected transfers. The low relative
share of the inheritance that these heirs then actually raise for an earlier retirement, is however
small, which suggests that they either already did adjust in some respect37 or that they prefer to
spend their inheritance on other goods.
IV. Robustness
IV.1. Endogenous Wealth
Our main results are based on estimations in which we excluded wealth as a control variable
due to the high likelihood of endogeneity of this variable. Individuals might save a lot over their
life-cycle and therefore acquire more wealth in order to leave the workforce early. Including wealth
as an additional control might be problematic as the inclusion of an endogenous variable can
cause our estimates for the influence of the transfer to be biased. On the other hand, excluding
wealth as control variable can introduce a bias, too: Wolff and Gittleman (2014) show that the
chance of receiving a transfer correlates with wealth. Hence, if households that have other large
changes in wealth are also more likely to receive large transfers, then our inheritance estimate
will be biased. A similar argument could be made with respect to income. In this subsection we
present a robustness check to see how severe the problem might be for our baseline results.
Columns (1) - (3) of table 7 show the results for our baseline fixed effect specification that
correspond to column (2) in table 4 with an inheritance dummy and the respective amount in
linear and squared terms. In column (1) we excluded Log(Net Income) as control variable, column
(2) again shows the results from table 4 (i.e. our main results), and column (3) additionally
includes the inverse hyperbolic sine transformed38 wealth of the household. Overall the results
are reassuring that the coefficients and standard errors of our main variables of interest remain
almost identical across the three estimations. Excluding wealth (and including income) in our
main specification therefore seems unlikely to cause problems. The fixed effect estimator already
should control for general wealth and other changes in wealth seem to be orthogonal to transfers.
37This might also be through already lowered expected retirement ages. If this logic would apply, we would however
also expect the dummy estimate in a more accurately estimated model to indicate a lower expected retirement age of
expecting heirs (irrespective of the size of the inheritance).
38The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is an alternative to log-transformations, that prevents us from discarding
wealth-observations with non-positive values.
20
The Affluency to Quit: How Inheritances Affect Retirement Plannings
Table 7: Expected Retirement Age - Endogenous Wealth
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Expected Retirement Age
Estimation Method: FE FE FE
Non-zero Inheritance Received=1 -0.110 -0.111 -0.096
(0.1817) (0.1817) (0.1809)
Total Inheritance in 10T Euro -0.084** -0.084** -0.082**
(0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0266)
Total Inheritance in 10T Euro × Total Inheritance in 10T Euro 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)




Year FE YES YES YES
Additional Controls YES YES YES
Number of Observations 16766 16766 16766
Number of Groups 4798 4798 4798
1 The table shows results of Linear Fixed Effect estimations, where the dependent variable is
the expected retirement age. All estimations are based on a sample of individuals that are
not retired in the first observation period. The estimations include a third order polynomial
of age, an indicator for having children, the number of children in the household, for
indicators for self-evaluated health status, indicators for being self-employed, civil servant
and region (East/West) as control variables.
2 Standard errors account for clustering on the household and individual level in columns.
3 Estimations are based on a multiple imputed dataset (5 imputations).
4 Estimations are based on SAVE 2005-2010.
5 Coefficients marked with +,*,** are statistically significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level.
IV.2. Simulation
The simulation results from our main model (see table 5) suggest that the area C is only slightly
bigger than D. The reduced public pension entitlement is typically fully compensated by the
prolonged pension receipt. The calculation of these areas, however, comes at the cost of losing
a considerable amount of observations. The reason for this is that we use the information on
the pension income from the period before the transfer receipt. Table 8 shows our results when
swapping areas C and D which increases the sample size for our simulation considerably.
Our preferred estimates in the third panel are slightly bigger than our previous estimations.
Note however, that this robustness test will slightly overstate the costs of an earlier retirement as
area C on average is bigger than area D (see table 15 in the appendix). We interpret these results
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Table 8: Robustness Simulation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in Expected Estimated Foregone Share Share
Retirement Age Income Labor Income of Inheritance of capitalized Inheritance
(xusual − xearly) (at xusual) (Area B + C) ((B + C)/Amount) ((B + C)/Capitalized Amount)
Baseline
Mean .39 1788 8612 .94 .68
Median .22 1755 5023 .47 .34
Obs. 807 807 782 782 782
Subsample
Mean .39 1804 8612 .94 .68
Median .22 1792 5023 .47 .34
Obs. 782 782 782 782 782
Subsample with Limited Loss
Mean .39 1804 8140 .55 .46
Median .22 1792 4597 .47 .34
Obs. 782 782 782 782 782
Based on SAVE 2005-2010, own calculations. Estimates are weighted.
thus as an upper bound result which would prevail if the penalty term in the statutory pension
system would not allow retirees to benefit from early retirement. After all, the estimates are still
close to our main simulation results.
V. Discussion of results
V.1. Main findings
The main purpose of this paper is to quantify the effect of inheritance receipts on the extensive
margin of the labor supply of heirs. In contrast to the existing literature, this paper does however
not look at the actual retirement entry but at the effects of inheritance receipt on the expected
retirement age. This feature enables us to add to the literature in some ways: Our analysis exploits
within individual variation, we are able to track reactions to transfer receipt over the entire
life-cycle and we are able to relate the opportunity costs of pension entry reactions to the size of
the received inheritance.
Our main estimation results indicate that heirs expect to retire on average four to five month
earlier than initially stated due to their wealth gain. Following Brown et al. (2010), we can interpret
this as indication that leisure is a normal good: The transfer receipt loosens the intertemporal
budget constraint, the income effect renders people demanding more free time. Rescaling these
estimates by taking the corresponding financial losses into account then reveals that this is a quite
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sizable effect. The average effect of five months translates into costs that amount, on average, to
one third of the total inheritance.
One might oppose, that this estimate is too high. And, indeed, it only reflects expected and not
yet actual changes in the retirement age. Also, as argued above, it is well possible that individuals
do not perceive to implicitly spend one third of their transfer on a moving forward of their
retirement: They only give up labor income that they do not yet have earned in return for the very
certain gain of leisure. While these losses are costs from an economic point of view, individuals
might rather focus on the sheer bookkeeping costs, which are presented by the difference between
area D (representing the decrease in statutory pension wealth) and C (representing the gains
through prolonged receipt of the statutory pension) in figure 1. Our calculations however predict
that these areas are not only of almost same size but rather seem to reward an early retirement.
Hence, the estimated reaction of heirs seems plausible judging on the actual bookkeeping costs.
The literature has recently focused on the ambiguous role of expectations about future inher-
itances on retirement decisions: Remarkably, individuals do not seem to adjust their life-cycle
consumption path to their expected inheritances.39 Also in our study, individuals receiving an
expected transfer seem to adjust after the actual receipt. As mentioned above, the literature has
suggested risk aversion and credit constraints as explanations.40 When receiving unexpected
inheritances, individuals do not react immediately, but rather seem to need some time to consider
the opportunities this wealth shock brings along. Further obstacles for (immediate) adjustment
might be that inheritances have a genuine value to the inheriting family, own bequest motives and
expectations of the preceding generations. Uncertainty (instead of calculable risk) about the wealth
of parents might add to the complex situation the heir is in. Hence, while this version of the paper
does not test or discuss possible explanations for the unexpectedly late adjustment behaviors, it
provides point estimates consistent with the results from the literature. Taking into account the
opportunity costs of early retirement however then relativizes these very findings: While heirs
which were expecting transfers showed strong reactions in absolute terms, their opportunity costs
measured in the inheritance amount are much smaller than in the baseline case.
39As mentioned above, different explanations for this finding were suggested. In another version of this paper, we have
tested most of these hypothesis. The thesis of Tobias Crusius will contain this detailed discussion.
40Myopia certainyl also qualifies as explanation.
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V.2. Policy implications
We introduced the paper with a brief overview of the recent discussion about the consequences of
potentially growing future inheritance flows in western societies for dimensions like inequality,
efficiency and mobility. In this regard, the economic costs of the earlier retirement of heirs are
most interesting. Our estimates reveal a high taste for leisure. Heirs thus work less and in
consequence are likely to earn less income and to accumulate lower savings. The consequences
of the awaited inheritance boom therefore might be somewhat balanced by the strong taste of
heirs for leisure. The inequality introduced through inheritances thus partly materializes in the
retirement behavior (and to a lesser extend in dimensions like wealth inequality): Heirs will be
better able to compensate decreasing replacement rates in statutory pension schemes41 and will
rather be able to benefit from early retirement.
If inheritance flows indeed increase and enable heirs widely to move their retirement entry age
forward, then this counteracts recent political attempts in Europes societies to extend working
lifes and to foster employment rates of the elderly. In view of this political goal, it seems odd that
individuals can extend their total pension wealth by retiring early. Increasing inheritance flows
might reinforce early retirement and might thus exacerbate the demographic burden on public
pension funds. An adjustment of the penalty term on statutory pension entitlements for early
retirement entries thus appears particularly suitable.
Finally, if individuals expect to spend a third of their inheritance on a moving forward of
their retirement entry, still 70% of the wealth gain remains. Life-cycle theory predicts that
individuals will also increase their life-time consumption level. Empirical papers suggest that
also the intensive margin of labor supply is decreasing after transfer receipt (Elinder and Erixson,
2012). The unknown remaining share of the transfer then might eventually be bequeathed again.42
An interesting task for future research would thus be to further decompose how individuals treat
the remaining 70% of their inheritances.
VI. Conclusion
The current paper uses the SAVE panel data set from Germany in order to estimate the effect
of wealth shocks on the extensive margin of labor supply decisions. Specifically, we exploit the
41Note that we have ignored households’ savings in our analysis.
42The SAVE data, in fact, also surveys whether individuals save in order to bequeath.
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receipt of intergenerational transfers as variation in wealth and use the stated expected retirement
age as variation in labor supply. We implement our estimations in a simulation study for which
we use predicted wages on the verge to retirement in order to monetize the financial costs of
the estimated moved forward retirement entry. Specifically, we calculate the pension losses for
the rest of the remaining life expectancy and the income losses due to the earlier retirement. We
find that heirs on average are willing to spend, ceteris paribus, 20-30% of their transfer on the
anticipated pension entry. We address endogeneity concerns with respect to wealth and explore
implications of expected transfer receipt. All in all, heirs show a high taste for leisure. The financial
implications might attentuate problems that recent studies associate with a potential inheritance
boom. Nonetheless, the early exit from the labor market remains only one among several channels
through which individuals can respond to wealth gains. It would be particularly worthwhile to
study in further detail how heirs allocate the remaining share of their wealth gains.
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VII. Appendix
VII.1. Data
VII.1.1 Actual retirement in the sample
The SAVE contains a question asking whether individuals are retired. We only use those ob-
servations in our further analysis that are not already retired in the first period of our sample.
We abstain from classifying individuals as de facto retired who report to receive zero income as
we cannot be entirely sure that they will not return to the labor market at some stage. figure
4 summarizes the retirement entrance behavior for men and women in our sample by plotting
the cross-sectional share of retired individuals against age. Conditional on having been part of
the workforce, women and men do not differ substantially in our sample with respect to their
retirement age. People of the age of 55 start to retire and by the age of 65 most individuals are
retired.


















40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Age
Men Women
Note: Share of individuals that report to be retired.
Source: SAVE 2005-2010, own calculations.
VII.1.2 The wealth concept in the SAVE data
The wealth information in the SAVE data covers assets and liabilities on the household level and
differentiates between the main wealth types. The SAVE data generally differentiates between
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financial, real estate wealth and business assets. Financial wealth covers deposits, building society
and life insurance assets, value of other private retirement savings, value of bonds, stocks and
real estate funds, state-subsidized savings (so called Riester Rente), value of other financial savings.
Real estate wealth contains the value of the households main residence and other real estates.
Liabilities comprise value of mortgage loans, value of building society loans, value of consumption
loans (cars, credit cards, ...), value of family and other loans. In a robustness check, we use net
wealth which is the sum of all assets net of all liabilities of the household as control variable in the
regressions. As reported in table 9 the median wealth is around 68,000 Euro.43
VII.1.3 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables
43Generally, it seems difficult to compare wealth measures across different data sets. While the median wealth in the
SAVE deviates from the SOEP wealth estimate (≈ 15.000 Euro in 2007), it comes close to the estimate based on the PHF
data (67900 Euro in 2013).(Bundesbank, 2013)
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Table 9: Descriptives - Control variables (Part I)
Mean St. Dev. Median Min Max
a. All Observations:
Age 50.92656 15.74711 50 18 98
Wealth 185431.1 569364.6 67706.9 -4204975 27000000
Individual Net Income 1397.354 1322.675 1171.459 0 43243.24
HH Net Income 2403.055 1817.404 2122.471 0 43243.24
East Germany .2821663 .4500625 0 0 1
Male .4752042 .4993944 0 0 1
Number of Children 1.784322 1.393685 2 0 13
Married .6723296 .4693729 1 0 1
Educational Attainment
Tertiary .1527594 .3597623 0 0 1
Abitur .2627476 .4401349 0 0 1
Apprenticeship .6938056 .4609203 1 0 1
No Regular Employment
Selfemployed .0391806 .1940281 0 0 1
Civil Servant .036205 .1868034 0 0 1
Unemployed .0815199 .2736371 0 0 1
Health Status
very good .0927334 .2900641 0 0 1
good .455824 .4980542 0 0 1
mediocre .346289 .4757958 0 0 1
rather bad .083024 .2759238 0 0 1
bad .0221295 .1471075 0 0 1
Risk Aversion and Credit Constraints
Riskneutral .0655312 .2474683 0 0 1
Riskavers=1 .0296791 .1697055 0 0 1
Riskavers=2 .1204586 .3255069 0 0 1
Riskavers=3 .7759013 .417 1 0 1
Constrained .1254346 .3312174 0 0 1
Based on SAVE 2005-2010, own calculations. Estimates are weighted.
1 Heirs are considered heirs if they have received an inheritance in the current or
any previous period.
VII.2. Auxiliary Regressions
VII.3. Simulation: detailed results
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Table 10: Descriptives - Control variables (Part II)
b. Heirs[1]:
Age 54.8437 13.66648 55 21 93
Net Wealth 288228.8 589289 177939.7 -419093.3 1.18e+07
Individual Net Income 1705.381 1668.929 1460.446 0 24750
HH net Income 2878.702 1985.444 2591.051 250 25000
East Germany .2309154 .4215075 0 0 1
Male .5460219 .4979827 1 0 1
Number of Children 1.931367 1.288192 2 0 12
Married .7559775 .4295969 1 0 1
Educational Attainment
Tertiary .2231429 .4164414 0 0 1
Abitur .3163508 .4651499 0 0 1
Apprenticeship .6681641 .4709719 1 0 1
No Regular Employment
Selfemployed .0433705 .2037328 0 0 1
Civil Servant .0520162 .2221067 0 0 1
Unemployed .084976 .2788519 0 0 1
Health Status
very good .0983533 .2978547 0 0 1
good .452897 .4978815 0 0 1
mediocre .3368957 .4727488 0 0 1
rather bad .0919253 .2889815 0 0 1
bad .0199286 .1397845 0 0 1
Risk Aversion and Credit Constraints
Riskneutral .0447226 .2067608 0 0 1
Riskavers=1 .0282696 .1657955 0 0 1
Riskavers=2 .1843174 .3878679 0 0 1
Riskavers=3 .7392302 .4391962 1 0 1
Constrained .0727873 .2598419 0 0 1
Based on SAVE 2005-2010, own calculations. Estimates are weighted.
1 Heirs are considered heirs if they have received an inheritance in the current or
any previous period.
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Table 11: Regular Retirement Entry in Germany by Birth Year
Birth Year Regular Retirement Age
<1947 65
1947 65 and 1 month
1948 65 and 2 months
1949 65 and 3 months
1950 65 and 4 months
1951 65 and 5 months
1952 65 and 6 months
1953 65 and 7 months
1954 65 and 8 months
1955 65 and 9 months
1956 65 and 10 months
1957 65 and 11 months
1958 66 month
1959 66 month and 2 months
1960 66 month and 4 months
1961 66 month and 6 months
1962 66 month and 8 months
1963 66 month and 10 months
>1963 67
1 Source: Deutsche Rentenver-
sicherung
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Table 12: Expected Percentage of Income in Retirement Simulation - OLS Results













Expected Retirement Age 1.394
(0.8710)












Number of Children -0.437*
(0.2189)
























Number of Observations 5168
1 The table shows the result of a OLS estimation when the dependent variable is the
expected percentage of current income during retirement.
2 Standard errors account for clustering on the household and individual level.
3 Estimations are based on a multiple imputed dataset (5 imputations).
4 Estimations are based on SAVE 2005-2010.
5 Coefficients marked with +,*,** are statistically significant under the 10, 5, 1 percent
significance level.
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Table 13: Income Simulation - OLS results
Dependent Variable: Log(Individual Net Income)
Age 0.239**
(0.0326)
Age × Age -0.004**
(0.0007)








education=1 × Age -0.168**
(0.0372)
education=2 × Age -0.011
(0.0458)
education=3 × Age -0.027
(0.0494)
education=1 × Age × Age 0.003**
(0.0008)
education=2 × Age × Age 0.000
(0.0010)
education=3 × Age × Age 0.000
(0.0010)
education=1 × Age × Age × Age -0.000**
(0.0000)
education=2 × Age × Age × Age -0.000
(0.0000)






Number of Children in HH 0.068**
(0.0152)
Number of HH Members -0.069**
(0.0130)
Married and Living Together -0.163**
(0.0158)
Health Status ’very good’ 0.240**
(0.0707)
Health Status ’good’ 0.192**
(0.0681)
Health Status ’mediocre’ 0.140*
(0.0683)














Number of Observations 14934
1 The table shows the result of a OLS estimation when the
dependent variable is the log of the individuals’ net income
if the individual is not retired. For the years 2006-2010 the
dependent variable was created by multiplying the share of
2 Standard errors account for clustering on the household and
individual level.
3 Estimations are based on a multiple imputed dataset (5 im-
putations).
4 Estimations are based on SAVE 2005-2010.
5 Coefficients marked with +,*,** are statistically significant un-
der the 10, 5, 1 percent significance level.
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Table 14: Expected Retirement Age - FE Estimation - Plus 60 excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Expected Retirement Age
Specificaiton
Baseline
Non-zero Inheritance Received=0 0.000 0.000
(.) (.)
Non-zero Inheritance Received=1 -0.111 -0.096
(0.1817) (0.1940)
Total Inheritance in 10T Euro -0.084** -0.078**
(0.0266) (0.0271)




Age × Age -0.017* -0.002
(0.0078) (0.0077)




Log(Net Income) -0.072 -0.070
(0.0870) (0.0889)
Health Status ’very good’ 1.092+ 0.841
(0.5767) (0.5846)
Health Status ’good’ 1.091+ 0.853
(0.5678) (0.5738)
Health Status ’mediocre’ 1.078+ 0.816
(0.5662) (0.5692)
Health Status ’rather bad’ 1.171* 0.895
(0.5460) (0.5629)
never UnEmployed 0.005 -0.021
(0.1160) (0.1202)
longterm UnEmployed 0.018 0.055
(0.1163) (0.1210)




























Number of Observations . .
R2 . .
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Table 15: Detailed simulation results (main model)
Costs of early retirement Relative costs of early retirement
Estimated Total1 Foregone Pension Extended pension Share of Share of
Income Cost income loss take up Inheritance Capitalized Amount
(at xusual) (L = B + D) (B) (D) (C) (L/Inherited Amount) (L/Capitalized Inherited Amount)
Baseline
Mean 1788 6905 4088 2192 4867 .76 .43
Median 1755 3916 2503 473 2467 .36 .22
Obs. 807 262 373 364 383 262 262
Subsample
Mean 1830 6905 3845 3028 4770 .76 .43
Median 1716 3916 2503 1177 2472 .36 .22
Obs. 262 262 262 240 262 262 262
Subsample with limited loss
Mean 1830 6602 3656 3028 4770 .50 .30
Median 1716 3550 2195 1177 2472 .36 .22
Obs. 262 262 262 240 262 262 262
Based on SAVE 2005-2010, own calculations. Estimates are weighted.
1 Note that the areas L, B, C, D are calculated individually, hence summing up average areas B¯ + D¯ does not necessarily yield L¯.
Labelling follows figure 1
37
Diskussionsbeiträge - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft - Freie Universität Berlin 




2017/1  ARONSSON, Thomas und Ronnie SCHÖB 
  Habit Formation and the Pareto-Efficient Provision of Public Goods 
  Economics 
 
2017/2  VOGT, Charlotte; Martin GERSCH und Cordelia GERTZ 
Governance in integrierten, IT-unterstützten Versorgungskonzepten im 
Gesundheitswesen : eine Analyse aktueller sowie zukünftig möglicher 
Governancestrukturen und -mechanismen 
  Wirtschaftsinformatik 
 
2017/3  VOGT, Charlotte; Martin GERSCH und Hanni KOCH 
Geschäftsmodelle und Wertschöpfungsarchitekturen intersektoraler,  
IT-unterstützter Versorgungskonzepte im Gesundheitswesen 
  Wirtschaftsinformatik 
 
2017/4  DOMBI, Akos und Theocharis GRIGORIADIS 
  Ancestry, Diversity & Finance : Evidence from Transition Economies 
  Economics 
 
2017/5  SCHREIBER, Sven 
  Weather Adjustment of Economic Output 
  Economics 
 
2017/6  NACHTIGALL, Daniel 
Prices versus Quantities: The Impact of Fracking on the Choice of Climate 
Policy Instruments in the Presence of OPEC 
  Economics 
 
2017/7  STOCKHAUSEN, Maximilian 
The Distribution of Economic Resources to Children in Germany 
  Economics 
 
2017/8  HETSCHKO, Clemens; Louisa von REUMONT und Ronnie SCHÖB 
Embedding as a Pitfall for Survey-Based Welfare Indicators: Evidence from an 
Experiment 
  Economics 
 
2017/9  GAENTZSCH, Anja 
Do Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) Raise Educational Attainment? A Case 
Study of Juntos in Peru 





2017/10 BACH, Stefan; Martin BEZNOSKA und Viktor STEINER 
An Integrated Micro Data Base for Tax Analysis in Germany 
  Economics 
 
2017/11 NEUGEBAUER, Martin und Felix WEISS 
Does a Bachelor’s Degree pay off? Labor Market Outcomes of Academic 
versus Vocational Education after Bologna 
  Economics 
 
2017/12 HACHULA, Michael und Dieter NAUTZ 




2017/13 CORNEO, Giacomo 
  Ein Staatsfonds, der eine soziale Dividende finanziert 
  Economics 
 
2017/14 GERSCH, Martin; Cordelia GERTZ und Charlotte VOGT 
Leistungsangebote in integrierten, IT-unterstützten Versorgungskonzepten:  
eine Konzeption (re-) konfigurierbarer Servicemodule im Gesundheitswesen 
  Wirtschaftsinformatik 
 
2017/15 KREUTZMANN, Ann-Kristin; Sören PANNIER; Natalia ROJAS-PERILLA; Timo 
SCHMID; Matthias TEMPL und Nikos TZAVIDIS 
The R Package emdi for Estimating and Mapping 
Regionally Disaggregated Indicators 
Economics 
 
2017/16 VOGT, Charlotte; Cordelia GERTZ und Martin GERSCH 
Ökonomische Evaluation eines integrierten, IT-unterstützten 




2017/17 GASTEIGER, Emanuel und Klaus PRETTNER 
A Note on Automation, Stagnation, and the Implications of a Robot Tax 
Economics 
 
2017/18 HAASE, Michaela 
The Changing Basis of Economic Responsibility: zur Bedeutung und 
Rezeption von John Maurice Clarks Artikel zur ökonomischen Verantwortung 
Marketing 
 
2017/19 FOSSEN, Frank M.; Ray REES; Davud ROSTAM-AFSCHAR und  
Viktor STEINER 




2017/20 NEIDHÖFER, Guido; Joaquín SERRANO und Leonardo GASPARINI 




2017/21 SCHMITZ, Sebastian: The Effects of Germany’s New Minimum Wage on 
Employment and Welfare Dependency 
Economics 
 
2017/22 WALTER, Paul; Marcus GROß, Timo SCHMID und Nikos TZAVIDIS: 




2017/23 WAGNER, Julia: Zinsbereinigte Besteuerung und Verlustvortrag : eine 
Mikrosimulation für deutsche Kapitalgesellschaften 
FACTS 
 
